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Abstract. Intentional agent systems are increasingly being used in a wide range of
complex applications. Capabilities has recently been introduced into some of these
systems as a software engineering mechanism to support modularity and reusability
while still allowing meta-level reasoning. This paper presents possible formalisations
of capabilities within the framework of beliefs, goals and intentions and indicates
how capabilities can affect agent reasoning about its intentions. We define a style
of agent commitment which we refer to as a self-aware agent which allows an agent
to modify its goals and intentions as its capabilities change. We also indicate which
aspects of the specification of a BDI interpreter are affected by the introduction
of capabilities and give some indications of additional reasoning which could be
incorporated into an agent system on the basis of both the theoretical analysis and
the existing implementation.
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1. Introduction
Agent systems are becoming increasingly popular for solving a wide
range of complex problems. Intentional agent systems have a sub-
stantial base in theory as well as a number of implemented systems
that are used for challenging applications such as air-traffic control
and space systems (Rao and Georgeff, 1995). One of the strengths of
the BDI Belief, Desire, Intention class of systems (including IRMA
(Bratman et al., 1988), PRS (Georgeff and Ingrand, 1989), JACK
(Busetta et al., 1999b), JAM (Huber, 1999) and UMPRS (Lee et al.,
1994)) is their strong link to theoretical work, in particular that of Rao
and Georgeff (Rao and Georgeff, 1991), but also Cohen and Levesque
(Cohen and Levesque, 1990), Bratman et al. (Bratman et al., 1988),
Shoham (Shoham, 1993) and Wooldridge (Wooldridge, 2000). Although
the theory is not implemented directly in the systems it does inform
and guide the implementations (Rao and Georgeff, 1992).
In this paper we investigate how a notion of capability can be in-
tegrated into the BDI logic of Rao and Georgeff (Rao and Georgeff,
1991), preserving the features of the logic while adding to it in ways
that eliminate current intuitive anomalies and mismatches between the
theory and implemented systems.
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We understand capability as the ability to act rationally towards
achieving a particular goal, in the sense of having an abstract plan
type that is believed to achieve the goal. Our notion of capability is
based on the philosophical idea that “can” implies both ability and op-
portunity (Cross, 1986; McCall, 1970). Our understanding of capability
is equivalent to the former. Depending on circumstances a capability
may not always result in an achievable plan for realising the goal, but
it is a prerequisite for such. Lack of either ability or opportunity imply
“cannot”. We argue that it is irrational to commit to a goal if one does
not have the ability (capability), but that with respect to opportunity
it is sufficient to believe that an opportunity may exist in the future.
This is somewhat different to the notion of ‘CAN’ explored by Moore
(Moore, 1985) and used more recently by Lin, Levesque, Lesperance
and Scherl (Lesperance et al., 2000; Lin and Levesque, 1998), where
“can” includes both ability and opportunity and is based on the idea
of the goal being necessarily achievable, rather than possibly achievable.
We argue that for agents operating in complex and dynamic worlds,
it is seldom if ever possible to reason about things being necessarily
achievable, and that what rational agents use in their planning and
acting is more a notion of possibility. It is rational to adopt a goal
if it is possibly achievable; rationality does not require the goal to be
necessarily achievable.
We describe a possible formal relationship of capabilities to the other
BDI concepts of beliefs, goals and intentions. The addition of capabil-
ities enriches the existing formal model and allows for definition of a
self-aware agent which takes on and remains committed to goals only if
it has a capability for such goals. The formalisation we introduce deals
only with a single agent, but we indicate directions for development
that would be suitable for dealing with rational behaviour in a multi-
agent system which takes into account the known capabilities of other
agents.
This work is partially motivated by the development and use of a
capability construct in JACK, a java based BDI agent development
environment (Busetta et al., 1999b), which follows the basic abstract
interpreter described in (Rao and Georgeff, 1992). We indicate how
capabilities can be integrated into this abstract interpreter and also
indicate some issues for consideration in the implementation of ca-
pabilities that are highlighted by this work. This work can be seen
as part of the ongoing interplay between theory and practice in the
area of BDI agent systems. It provides a foundation for exploring
some of the practical reasoning mechanisms involving capabilities and
for further developing the theory as well as informing the ongoing
implementations.
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2
we motivate the introduction of capabilities into the BDI-framework
and show what kind of reasoning can be achieved. Section 3 describes
the BDI-logic that is the basis of our approach while our approach is
described in section 4. An extension of (section 5) and an alternative
to (section 6) our approach are also briefly described. In section 7 we
describe an abstract interpreter which follows the logic of our system.
We also make some recommendations for limited changes to the im-
plementation of capabilities in JACK in order to support the kind of
reasoning suggested in section 2, in a way that is consistent with the
theory of capability as used by us. Finally, in section 8 we compare the
notion of capability that we have explored, to related notions of “can”
and “ability” in the philosophical literature. We also compare our work
to some other work on capability/can/ability in agent systems. Section
9 concludes the paper.
2. Using Capabilities in Reasoning
Most BDI systems contain a plan library made up of plans which are
essentially abstract specifications for achieving certain goals or doing
sub-tasks on the way to achieving a goal. Each plan is associated with
a triggering event (which may be an event of type achieve goal φ). Each
plan may also have a list of pre-conditions or a context which describes
the situation in which the plan is intended to be used. The context
condition may be used to bind variables which are then used in the
plan body. The plan body is the code which executes the plan. This
may contain invocations of sub-goals which allow new plans to flesh out
the detail of the plan, calls to external “actions” (e.g. by other agents),
or other code in the plan or host language.
We understand having a capability (for) φ as meaning that the agent
has at least one plan that has as its trigger the goal φ. The context
condition of the plan can be understood as representing the situation
in which the agent has the opportunity to achieve φ using this plan.
In the terms of Cross (Cross, 1986) those worlds in which the context
condition of one of the plans to achieve φ is true are precisely those
worlds in which it is reasonable for the agent to demonstrate that it
has the ability to achieve φ.
At any given time the agent may be unable to actually use this plan
(if the pre-conditions or context are not true then it does not have the
opportunity to achieve its goal using this plan). However, if there is no
plan for φ then clearly no amount of opportunity will enable the agent
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to act intentionally in such a way that it brings about φ. Thus we say
that the agent does not have capability φ.1
This notion of capability φ means then that it is possible that the
agent, if it acts rationally, can achieve φ in some future world. Much of
the work on reasoning about what agents “can” do, assumes a stronger
notion of what we call capability - namely that “can” φ, or capability
φ means that if the agent acts rationally it will necessarily achieve φ in
some future world (e.g. (Moore, 1985; Lesperance et al., 2000; Lin and
Levesque, 1998)). We believe that this stronger notion is too restrictive
for the kind of reasoning about rational action that is needed in agent
systems. Whilst it is possible to know what opportunities exist in the
present, goals and intentions are primarily future directed (Bratman et
al., 1988), and in a dynamic and uncertain environment, it is seldom
possible to reason about what opportunities will necessarily exist in
some future world. For rational action it is sufficient that the agent
limit its goals to things it may have an opportunity to achieve in some
future world.
Given that agents are not omniscient and that perception, or dis-
covering facts about the world may require effort, adopting a goal may
actually direct a rational agent’s perception, or information finding
action, to watch for or create the opportunity needed to realise its
capability. Moore provides an illustrative example where he explains
that in order to say an agent “can” open a safe, the agent needs to
know how to do the action (or execute the plan) to dial a combination
and open a lock, but it also needs to know the combination (Moore,
1985). We would argue that our agent has a capability to open the
safe, but it will only have the opportunity if it knows the combination
(and perhaps other factors). Having the goal to open the safe, and
knowing the opportunity requirements, may lead the agent to direct its
perception to acquiring the relevant knowledge - - for example observing
carefully when someone else opens the safe.
In complex real systems there is usually far more information po-
tentially available than can reasonably be processed. By knowing the
situation in which a capability to achieve a goal can be used, the agent
can focus its perception on watching for the appropriate situation or
opportunity to use its capability.
The capabilities implemented in JACK are not exactly the notion
of capability we have developed so far in terms of reasoning about
goals and intentions. However, they are useful in realising efficient
1 This assumes that all plans explicitly state what goals they achieve, and does
not take account of goals being achieved as a result of side-effects. This is consistent
with how many BDI systems of which we are aware are implemented, and is part of
the mechanism which allows for efficient practical reasoning.
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reasoning about capability. To avoid confusion we will refer to JACK’s
implementation of capabilities as capability modules.
A capability module in JACK is essentially a set of plans, a fragment
of the knowledge base that is manipulated by those plans and a specifi-
cation of the interface to the capability module (Busetta et al., 1999a).
The interface is specified partially in terms of what events generated
external to the capability module, can be handled by it. Thus a part
of the interface to a capability module is a list of the goal achievement
events that it is designed to handle. Additional sub-goals and the plans
that deal with these can be hidden within the internals of the capability
module. The interface also specifies what events generated internally
are to be visible externally and gives information as to what portion of
the knowledge base fragment is used by the capability.
As an example a scheduling capability module may contain a set of
plans to construct a schedule in a certain domain. The knowledge base
fragment defined as part of this module may have knowledge about the
objects to be scheduled, their priorities, and various other information
that is generated and used as a schedule is being built. There may be a
single external goal event called achieve-schedule which this capability
module responds to, while the only events it generates that are seen
externally are events which output a schedule or which notify failure
to generate a schedule.
Reasoning about whether or not an agent should adopt a particular
top-level goal, can be done by examining its capability module decla-
rations, rather than by examining all plans. For this reasoning to be
sound the sets of plans must be abstracted into capability modules in
such a way that the module is self contained (i.e. does not necessarily
rely on other capability modules for its successful execution), or that
its dependencies are explicit and are reasoned about. Abstracting the
representation to allow reasoning over capability modules, rather than
plans, supports the efficient real-time reasoning that is a critical part
of these kind of agent systems. If the agent system is a closed multi-
agent system, it is reasonable to assume that any plans needed for
successful execution of a goal handled by a capability module, will
be found somewhere within the system, if not within that capability
module. However, if capabilities are able to be added and deleted (or
activated and de-activated) dynamically, or if agents are relying on the
capabilities of other agents which may come and go, in order to achieve
their goals, then it becomes necessary to represent any sub-goals within
a capability module which require another capability, or perhaps the
assistance of another agent.
Busetta et al. (Busetta et al., 1999a) describe how agents can be
built by incorporating specific capabilities. A growing amount of work
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in multi-agent systems discusses agents with varying “roles”. If an agent
changes roles dynamically the expectation is that their behaviour also
changes. One way to achieve this could be to use capabilities. A ca-
pability module could specify and implement the things that an agent
could do within a particular role. As an agent changed role, appropriate
capabilities could then be activated or de-activated.
While a capability (in general language usage) cannot be regarded as
a mental attitude similar to beliefs, desires, goals and intentions, beliefs
about capabilities (both one’s own and others) are clearly important
mental attitudes for reasoning about action.
When we talk about goals and intentions we expect that they are
related to aspects of the world that the agent has (at least poten-
tially) some control over. While it is reasonable to talk about an agent
having a desire for it to be sunny tomorrow, having a goal for it to
be sunny tomorrow makes little intuitive sense - unless of course our
agent believes it can control the weather. Just as goals are constrained
to be a consistent sub-set of the set of desires, and of beliefs we would
argue that they should also be constrained to be consistent with its
capabilities (at least within a single agent system - this needs to be
modified for multi-agent systems but the notion of capability remains
relevant; for multi-agent systems one must also consider capabilities of
agents other than oneself). As intentions are commitments to achieve
goals these also are intuitively limited to aspects of the world the agent
has some control over. Consequently, we would wish our agent’s goals
and intentions to be limited by its capabilities (or what it believes to
be its capabilities).
Capabilities may also provide a suitable level at which agents in a
multi-agent heterogeneous system have information about other agents.
An agent observing an (external) event that it may not itself have the
capability to respond to, may pass on the event to another agent if it
believes that agent has the capability to respond to the event. (Beliefs
about) capabilities of other agents may also provide a mechanism for
supporting co-operation. An agent in a multi-agent system may contact
or try to influence some other agent with the required capability, or
alternatively may make decisions about its own actions based on the
believed capabilities of other agents. Goals of an agent in a multi-agent
system are likely to be constrained (in some way) by the capabilities
of other agents as well as one’s own capabilities.
We explore a possible formalisation of capabilities within BDI logic
that incorporates them naturally as constraining goals and intentions,
while being themselves constrained by beliefs - a rational agent cannot
believe itself to have a capability to achieve something which it does
not believe is a possible state of affairs in some future world. We first
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summarise the BDI logic of Rao and Georgeff and then explore how this
can be extended to incorporate capabilities - currently in the context
of a single agent reasoning about its own capabilities, although we are
also working on extending this to multi-agent systems.
3. The BDI logic of Rao and Georgeff
The logic developed by Rao and Georgeff (e.g. (Rao and Georgeff,
1991; Rao and Georgeff, 1992)) is a logic involving multiple worlds,
where each world is a time-tree of world states with branching time
future and single time past. The various nodes in the future of the
time-tree represent the results of different events or agent actions. The
different worlds (i.e. different time-tree structures) result from incom-
plete knowledge about the current state of the world and represent
different scenarios of future choices and effects based on differing cur-
rent state. Formally, we have the following definition (Rao and Georgeff,
1991).2
DEFINITION 1. An interpretation M is defined as a tuple < W, E, T,
≺, U, B, G, I, Φ >. W is a set of worlds, E is a set of primitive event
types, T is a set of time points, ≺ is a total, transitive and backward-
linear binary relation on time points, U is the universe of discourse,
and Φ is a mapping of first-order entities to elements in U for any
given world and time point. A situation wt is a world w at a given
time point t. B, G and I are accessibility relations for beliefs, goals and
intentions, respectively. B ⊆ W × T × W, and similarly for G and I.
We will use Bwt for the worlds accessible from world w at time t.
A world w of W is a tuple < Tw, Aw, Sw, Fw > where Tw ⊆ T is a
set of time points in w and Aw is ≺ restricted to w. Sw and Fw are arc
functions that map adjacent time points to events in E. Sw represents
successfully occurring events while Fw represents failed events.
The syntax of the language is given in figure 1.
The main value of Rao and Georgeff’s formalism is that it avoids
anomalies present in some other formalisms whereby an agent is forced
to accept as goals (or intentions) all side effects of a given goal (or inten-
tion). Modalities are ordered according to a strength relation <strong
where BEL <strong GOAL <strong INTEND, and modal operators are
2 As seen in definition 1, the original Rao and Georgeff formalism defines event
types and a mechanism for defining the success and failure of events. Our extension
of the BDI formalism does not concern events and we ignore this part of the original
formalism in the remainder of this paper.
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state formulae:
- - any first-order formula is a state formula.
- - if φ1 and φ2 are state formulae, and x is a variable, then ¬φ1,
φ1 ∨ φ2, and ∃ x: φ1(x) are state formulae.
- - if φ is a state formula then BEL(φ), GOAL(φ) and INTEND(φ) are
state formulae.
- - if ψ is a path formula, then optional(ψ) is a state formula.
path formulae:
- - any state formula is a path formula.
- - if ψ1 and ψ2 are path formulae, then ¬ψ1, ψ1 ∨ ψ2, ψ1
⋃
ψ2, ♦ ψ1,
© ψ1 are path formulae.
abbreviations:
- - φ1 ∧ φ2 is defined as ¬(¬φ1 ∨ ¬φ2)
- - ∀ x: φ(x) is defined as ¬ ∃ x: ¬ φ(x)
- - inevitable(ψ) is defined as ¬ optional(¬ψ)
- - 2 ψ is defined as ¬ ♦ ¬ ψ
Figure 1. Syntax of the Rao and Georgeff logic.
not closed under implication with respect to a weaker modality, making
formulae such as:
GOAL(ψ) ∧ BEL(inevitable((ψ ⊃ γ))) ∧ ¬GOAL(γ)
satisfiable. That is it is possible to not have a goal for something which
one believes to be a logical consequence of a goal one does have. Thus
it is possible to have a goal to go to the dentist, to believe that going to
the dentist necessarily involves pain, but not have a goal to have pain.
Unlike the logic of predicate calculus BDI logic formulae are always
evaluated with respect to particular time points. The logic has two
kinds of formulae; state formulae are evaluated at a specific point in
a time-tree (a situation), whereas path formulae are evaluated over a
path in a time-tree. The modal operator optional is said to be true of a
path formula θ at a particular point in a time-tree if θ is true of at least
one path emanating from that point. The operator inevitable is said to
be true of a path formula θ at a particular point in a time-tree if θ is
true of all paths emanating from that point. The logic also includes the
standard temporal operators © (next), ♦ (eventually),  (always) and
⋃
(until) which operate over path formulae.
A belief α, (written BEL(α)) implies that α is true in all belief-
accessible worlds. Similarly, a goal (GOAL(α)) is something which is
true in all goal-accessible worlds and an intention (INTEND(α)) is
true in all intention-accessible worlds. The accessibility relations are
called B, G and I for BEL, GOAL and INTEND, respectively. The
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M, v, wt |= q(y1,...,yn) iff<v(y1),...,v(yn)> ∈ Φ[q,w,t] where q(y1,...,yn)
is a predicate formula.
M, v, wt |= ¬φ iff M, v, wt 6|= φ
M, v, wt |= φ1 ∨ φ2 iff M, v, wt |= φ1 or M, v, wt |= φ2
M, v, wt |= ∃ x: φ(x) iff M, v
x
d, wt |= φ for some d in U
M, v, (wt0 ,wt1 ,...) |= φ iff M, v, wt0 |= φ
M, v, (wt0 ,wt1 ,...) |= © ψ iff M, v, (wt1 ,...) |= ψ
M, v, (wt0 ,wt1 ,...) |= ♦ ψ iff ∃ k ≥ 0: M, v, (wtk ,...) |= ψ
M, v, (wt0 ,wt1 ,...) |= ψ1
⋃
ψ2 iff
(a) ∃ k ≥ 0: M, v, (wtk ,...) |= ψ2 and
∀ j, 0 ≤ j < k: M, v, (wtj ,...) |= ψ1
or (b) ∀ j ≥ 0: M, v, (wtj ,...) |= ψ1
M, v, wt0 |= optional(ψ) iff there exists a fullpath (wt0 ,wt1 ,...) such that
M, v, (wt0 ,wt1 ,...) |= ψ
M, v, wt |= BEL(φ) iff ∀ w
′ ∈ Bwt : M , v, w
′
t |= φ
M, v, wt |= GOAL(φ) iff ∀ w
′ ∈ Gwt : M , v, w
′
t |= φ
M, v, wt |= INTEND(φ) iff ∀ w
′ ∈ Iwt : M , v, w
′
t |= φ
Figure 2. Semantics of the Rao and Georgeff logic.
optional eventually p
optional always r
inevitable eventually q
inevitable always s
w3 w4w0
w1 w2
w6w5
r s
s p s q
r s q
s qs
r s
In this world evaluated over the path {w0,w1,w2} always s is true
In this world evaluated over the path {w5,w6} next q is true
In this world evaluated at w0, the following are true
Figure 3. Diagram illustrating evaluation of formulae in a world.
axiomatisation for beliefs is the standard weak-S5 (or KD45) modal
system. For goals and intentions the D and K axioms are adopted.
Figure 2 gives the semantics of the language. In the figure, M is an
interpretation, wt is a situation and v is a variable assignment. Further,
vxd is the function that yields d for the variable x and is the same as v
everywhere else.3 Figure 3 illustrates evaluation of some formulae in a
belief, goal or intention world (i.e. a time-tree).
The logic requires that goals be compatible with beliefs (and in-
tentions compatible with goals). This is enforced by requiring that for
3 We note that for M, v, wt |= BEL(φ) to hold, w
′
t needs to exist for each world
w′ that is belief-accessible from wt. Similarly for GOAL and INTEND.
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each belief-accessible world w at time t, there must be a goal-accessible
sub-world of w at time t. This ensures that no formula can be true in
all goal-accessible worlds unless it is true in a belief-accessible world.
There is a similar relationship between goal-accessible and intention-
accessible worlds. Intuitively, a world is a sub-world (v) of another
world if it is a copy of the first world except that some time branches
may be missing. For a formal definition we refer to (Rao and Georgeff,
1991).
The key axioms of what Rao and Georgeff refer to as the basic
I-system (Rao and Georgeff, 1991) are as follows4
AI1 GOAL(α) ⊃ BEL(α)
An agent that adopts a formula as a goal (e.g. optional ♦ p) also
believes that formula.
AI2 INTEND(α) ⊃ GOAL(α)
An agent adopts intentions only towards things that are goals.
AI4 INTEND(φ) ⊃ BEL(INTEND(φ))
if an agent intends something it believes that it intends it.
AI5 GOAL(φ) ⊃ BEL(GOAL(φ))
if an agent has something as a goal then it believes that it has it as
a goal.
AI6 INTEND(φ) ⊃ GOAL(INTEND(φ))
if an agent intends something it has the goal to intend it.
AI8 INTEND(φ) ⊃ inevitable ♦ (¬ INTEND(φ))
intentions are always dropped eventually
Associated with the axioms AI1, AI2 and AI4-AI6 are a number of
semantic conditions:
CI1 ∀ w′ ∈ Bwt , ∃ w
′′ ∈ Gwt : w
′′ v w′
For each belief-accessible world, w at time t, there exists a goal-
accessible sub-world of w, at time t.
CI2 ∀ w′ ∈ Gwt , ∃ w
′′ ∈ Iwt : w
′′ v w′
For each goal-accessible world, w at time t, there exists an intention-
accessible sub-world of w, at time t.
CI4 ∀w′ ∈ Bwt , ∀w
′′ ∈ Iw
′
t : w
′′ ∈ Iwt
This restricts intention-accessible worlds from belief-accessible worlds
to be intention-accessible worlds.
CI5 ∀w′ ∈ Bwt , ∀w
′′ ∈ Gw
′
t : w
′′ ∈ Gwt
This restricts goal-accessible worlds from belief-accessible worlds to
4 AI1 and AI2 only hold for so-called O-formulae which are formulae with no
positive occurrences of inevitable outside the scope of the modal operators. See
(Rao and Georgeff, 1991) for details. Also ⊃ is implication (not superset). Further,
AI3 and AI7 in the original framework deal with events and are not shown here.
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be goal-accessible worlds.
CI6 ∀w′ ∈ Gwt , ∀w
′′ ∈ Iw
′
t : w
′′ ∈ Iwt
This restricts intention-accessible worlds from goal-accessible worlds
to be intention-accessible worlds.
The conditions CI4, CI5 and CI6 are subtly different from the condi-
tions in (Rao and Georgeff, 1991), which appear to be slightly wrong.
The (Rao and Georgeff, 1991) versions of CI4, CI5 and CI6 respectively
are:
∀w′ ∈ Bwt , ∀w
′′ ∈ Iwt : w
′′ ∈ Bw
′
t
∀w′ ∈ Bwt , ∀w
′′ ∈ Gwt : w
′′ ∈ Bw
′
t
∀w′ ∈ Gwt , ∀w
′′ ∈ Iwt : w
′′ ∈ Gw
′
t
We first show that our version of CI4 leads to the desired results.
Assume CI4 and M , v, wt |= INTEND(φ). Then we want to prove that
M , v, wt |= BEL(INTEND(φ)) or ∀ w
1 ∈ Bwt : M , v, w
1
t |= INTEND(φ)
or ∀ w1 ∈ Bwt : ∀ w
2 ∈ Iw
1
t : M , v, w
2
t |= φ. Given CI4 we know that ∀
w1 ∈ Bwt : ∀ w
2 ∈ Iw
1
t : w
2 ∈ Iwt . Further, as M , v, wt |= INTEND(φ),
we know that ∀ w2 ∈ Iwt : M , v, w
2
t |= φ. This gives the result.
Our version of CI4 restricts intention-accessible worlds from belief-
accessible worlds to be intention-accessible worlds. This is the key to
the result as we have assumed that all intention-accessible worlds model
φ. The (Rao and Georgeff, 1991) version of CI4, however, does not
say anything about intention-accessible worlds from belief-accessible
worlds. It allows for intention-accessible worlds from belief-accessible
worlds not to be intention-accessible. Therefore, these worlds can model
φ or ¬ φ and thus BEL(INTEND(φ)) does not necessarily hold. Similar
comments hold for CI5 and CI6.
The framework can then be used as a basis for describing and explor-
ing various commitment axioms that correspond to agents that behave
in various ways with respect to commitment to their intentions. Rao
and Georgeff describe axioms for what they call a blindly committed
agent, a single-minded agent and an open-minded agent, showing that
as long as an agent’s beliefs about the current state of the world are
always true, as long as the agent only acts intentionally5, and as long
as nothing happens that is inconsistent with the agent’s expectations,
then these agents will eventually achieve their goals.
4. Semantics of Capabilities
As discussed previously it makes little intuitive sense to have a goal
and an intention for the sun to shine, unless an agent also has some
5 This includes not dropping goals as this would lead to dropping intentions.
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mechanism for acting to achieve this world state. We extend the BDI
logic of Rao and Georgeff’s I-system (Rao and Georgeff, 1991; Rao
and Georgeff, 1992) to incorporate capabilities which constrain agent
goals and intentions to be compatible with what it believes are its
capabilities. We call our extended logic the IC-system (Padgham and
Lambrix, 2000).
The IC-system requires capability-accessible worlds exactly analo-
gous6 to belief-accessible worlds, goal-accessible worlds and intention-
accessible worlds. CAP(φ) is then defined as being true if φ is true in
all the capability-accessible worlds. If C is the accessibility relation with
respect to capabilities, then
M , v, wt |= CAP(φ) iff ∀ w
′ ∈ Cwt : M , v, w
′
t |= φ
We adopt the K and D axioms for capabilities, i.e. capabilities are
closed under implication and consistent. Similarly to the belief, goal and
intention accessible worlds, we also constrain the capability accessible
worlds based on their compatibility with the worlds accessible via the
other modalities. Therefore, in the next section we give axioms and
semantic conditions to capture the desired interrelationships among an
agent’s beliefs, capabilities, goals and intentions.
4.1. Compatibility Axioms
The first two axioms of the basic I-system described in the previous
section have to do with the compatibility between beliefs and goals,
and goals and intentions. We add two further compatibility axioms
relating to capabilities. Note that the compatibility axioms refer only
to so-called O-formula, i.e. formula that do not contain any positive
occurrences of inevitable outside the scope of the modal operators.
Belief-Capability Compatibility
This axiom states that if the agent has an O-formula α as a capability,
the agent believes that formula.
AIC1 CAP(α) ⊃ BEL(α)
Thus if an agent has the capability that optional(ψ) is true, this also
implies a belief that optional(ψ) is true. This should not be read as
having a capability for α implies that α is believed to be true. The
natural language semantics is closer to the statement that if an agent
has a capability for α (at time t), then the agent believes that it is
possible for α to be true (at time t). Statements where α is a simple
predicate rather than a formula involving optional must be evaluated
at a particular time point. So CAP(rich) ⊃ BEL(rich) means that if
an agent is capable of being rich now then the agent believes he is rich
6 See section 5 for an alternative definition.
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now. Importantly it does not mean that if the agent has a capability
of being rich in the future, he believes that he is rich in the future -
he believes only that there is some possible future where he is rich.
To say that the agent is capable of being rich in the future we would
write CAP(optional ♦ rich) or CAP(inevitable ♦ rich). In the first
case we state that in the capability-accessible worlds there always is a
future in which the agent is rich. However, there is no guarantee that
this future will actually be the future for the agent. If the agent has
the capability of being rich in every possible future, then the second
case may be used. We observe that this is a much stronger statement
than the first statement. We also note that intuitively it only really
makes sense to talk about capabilities (and goals and intentions) with
respect to future time, so the semantics of formulae such as CAP(rich)
⊃ BEL(rich) are intuitively awkward though not problematic. This is
inherent in the original logic and applies to goals and intentions at least
as much as to capabilities. It could be addressed by limiting the form
of valid formulae using CAP, GOAL and INTEND but we have chosen
to remain consistent with the original BDI logic.
The semantic condition associated with this axiom is:7
CIC1 ∀ w′ ∈ Bwt , ∃ w
′′ ∈ Cwt : w
′′ v w′.
For each belief-accessible world, w at time t, there exists a capability-
accessible sub-world of w, at time t.
As mentioned before, intuitively, a world is a sub-world (v) of an-
other world if it is a copy of the first world except that some time
branches may be missing. Figure 4 illustrates a structure that satisfies
the semantic condition CIC1.
Capability-Goal Compatibility
This axiom and associated semantic condition states that if the agent
has an O-formula α as a goal, then the agent also has α as a capability.
This constrains the agent to adopt as goals only formulae where there
is a corresponding capability.
AIC2 GOAL(α) ⊃ CAP(α)
Having a goal for something, implies having a capability for that some-
thing.
7 B, C, G and I are the accessibility relations with respect to beliefs, capabilities,
goals and intentions respectively.
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Figure 4. A structure satisfying CIC1.
CIC2 ∀ w′ ∈ Cwt , ∃ w
′′ ∈ Gwt : w
′′ v w′. For each capability-accessible
world, w at time t, there exists a goal-accessible sub-world of w,
at time t.
4.2. Mixed Modality Axioms
Axioms AI4, AI5 and AI6 define the relationships when the BEL,
GOAL and INTEND modalities are nested. We add two new axioms
and a corollary along with semantic conditions to capture the relation-
ship between CAP and each of the other modalities. We note that the
original axiom AI4 actually follows from AI1 and AI6.
Beliefs about Capabilities
If the agent has a capability α then it believes that it has a capability
α.
AIC3 CAP(α) ⊃ BEL(CAP(α))
CIC3 ∀w′ ∈ Bwt , ∀w
′′ ∈ Cw
′
t : w
′′ ∈ Cwt
This restricts capability-accessible worlds from belief-accessible worlds
to be capability-accessible worlds.
Capabilities regarding Goals
If an agent has a goal α then it has the capability to have the goal α.
AIC4 GOAL(α) ⊃ CAP(GOAL(α))
CIC4 ∀w′ ∈ Cwt , ∀w
′′ ∈ Gw
′
t : w
′′ ∈ Gwt
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This restricts goal-accessible worlds from capability-accessible worlds to
be goal-accessible worlds.
Capabilities regarding Intentions
If an agent has an intention α it also has the capability to have the
intention α.
Follows from AIC2 and AI6
INTEND(α) ⊃ CAP(INTEND(α))
semantic condition:
∀w′ ∈ Cwt , ∀w
′′ ∈ Iw
′
t : w
′′ ∈ Iwt
This restricts intention-accessible worlds from capability-accessible worlds
to be intention-accessible worlds.
Strengthening of this group of axioms by replacing implication with
equivalence would result in the expanded version of the equivalences
mentioned in (Rao and Georgeff, 1991) namely INTEND(α) ≡
BEL(INTEND(α)) ≡ CAP(INTEND(α)) ≡ GOAL(INTEND(α)) and
GOAL(α)≡ BEL(GOAL(α)) ≡ CAP(GOAL(α)). Equivalence strength-
ening would also give CAP(α) ≡ BEL(CAP(α)), which would imply
that the agent has full knowledge about its capabilities. As mentioned
in (Rao and Georgeff, 1991) this has the effect of collapsing mixed
nested modalities to their simpler non-nested forms.
We refer to the axioms AI2, AI6, AI8, AIC1, AIC2, AIC3 and AIC4
as the basic IC-system. We note that all axioms of the I-system remain
true, although some are consequences rather than axioms.8
4.3. Commitment Axioms
Rao and Georgeff define three variants of a commitment axiom, which
taken together with the basic axioms define what they call a blindly
committed agent, a single-minded agent and an open-minded agent. The
blindly committed agent maintains intentions until they are believed
true, the single-minded agent maintains intentions until they are be-
lieved true or are believed impossible to achieve, while the open-minded
agent maintains intentions until they are believed true or are no longer
goals.
We define an additional kind of agent which we term a self-aware
agent which is able to drop an intention if it believes it no longer has
the capability for that intention.
8 AI1 follows from AIC1 and AIC2. AI4 follows from AIC1, AIC2 and AI6. AI5
follows from AIC1 and AIC4.
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The self-aware agent is defined by the basic IC-system plus the
following axiom which we call AIC9d.9
AIC9d INTEND(inevitable♦φ) ⊃
inevitable(INTEND(inevitable♦φ)
⋃
(BEL(φ) ∨¬CAP(optional♦φ)))
Intending φ implies either continuing to intend φ, or the agent believes
φ is true, or it does not have the capability for φ in any possible future.
As an example, a self-aware agent that has the intention of being
rich in every possible future, will keep this intention until he believes
he is rich or until he does not have the capability of being rich in the
future any more. This last fact would mean that there are capability-
accessible worlds where the agent does not become rich in any possible
future in that world.
It is then possible to show that a self-aware agent will inevitably
eventually believe its intentions, and to prove a new theorem that
under certain circumstances the self-aware agent will achieve its in-
tentions. Self-awareness can be combined with either open-mindedness
or single-mindedness to obtain self-aware-open-minded and self-aware-
single-minded agents.
THEOREM 1. A basic self-aware agent, with the basic IC-system and
the axiom AIC9d, satisfies the following property, that if an agent in-
tends something, and retains the capability for that something until it
believes it is true, then it will eventually believe that that something is
true:
INTEND(inevitable♦φ) ∧
inevitable( CAP(optional♦φ)
⋃
BEL(φ))
⊃ inevitable(♦ BEL(φ))
Proof:
Assume the premise. Then from AIC9d we can conclude
inevitable(INTEND(inevitable♦φ)
⋃
(BEL(φ) ∨ ¬CAP(optional♦φ))).
By AI8 and the definition of
⋃
we can conclude inevitable(♦ (BEL(φ)
∨ ¬CAP(optional♦φ))). Given the fact that inevitable(CAP(optional♦φ)
⋃
BEL(φ)), we can conclude that inevitable(♦ BEL(φ)). ♣
As an example, the theorem states that if an agent is a self-aware
agent, who intends to be rich in the future and retains his capability of
being rich in the future until he believes he is rich, then the agent will
believe that he is rich at some point of time in the future.
9 This numbering is chosen because of the relationship of AIC9d to AI9a, AI9b,
and AI9c in the original I-system.
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A competent agent (Cohen and Levesque, 1990) is an agent that
satisfies the axiom of true beliefs, i.e. BEL(φ) ⊃ φ (AI10). It can
then be shown that a competent self-aware agent will achieve its in-
tentions, rather than just believing so. However, as discussed in (Rao
and Georgeff, 1991), AI10 is often difficult to live up to for agents as
it requires true beliefs about future realisation of its intentions. AI10
may therefore need to be restricted to current beliefs or to beliefs about
primitive actions.
THEOREM 2. A competent basic self-aware agent, with the basic IC-
system and the axioms AIC9d and AI10, satisfies the following prop-
erty, that if an agent intends something, and retains the capability for
that something until it believes it is true, then that something will even-
tually be true:
INTEND(inevitable♦φ) ∧
inevitable( CAP(optional♦φ)
⋃
BEL(φ))
⊃ inevitable(♦ φ)
Proof: Follows directly from the proof of the theorem 1 and AI10.
♣
4.4. Properties of the Logic
The logic allows for believing things without having the capability
for this, i.e. BEL(φ) ∧ ¬ CAP(φ) is satisfiable. This means that, for
instance, you can believe the sun will inevitably rise, without having
a capability for this. Also inevitable( BEL(φ)) ∧ ¬ GOAL(φ) is sat-
isfiable. Similarly, one can have the capability for something without
having the goal for this. In general, a modal formula does not imply
a stronger modal formula, where BEL <strong CAP <strong GOAL
<strong INTEND.
THEOREM 3. For modalities R1 and R2 such that R1 <strong R2, the
following formulae are satisfiable:
(a) R1(φ) ∧ ¬R2(φ)
(b) inevitable( R1(φ)) ∧ ¬R2(φ)
Proof: We prove the result for BEL and CAP. The proof for the
other pairs of modalities is similar. Assume BEL(φ). Then, φ is true in
every belief-accessible world. For every belief-accessible world there is
a capability-accessible world. However, C may map to worlds that do
not correspond to any belief-accessible world. If φ is not true in one of
these worlds, then φ is not a capability. This shows the satisfiability of
(a). Similar reasoning yields (b). ♣
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As we have seen before, the modalities are closed under implication.
However, another property of the logic is that a modal operator is
not closed under implication with respect to weaker modalities. For
instance, an agent may have the capability for φ, believe that φ implies
γ, but not have the capability for γ.10 As an example, an agent may
have the capability for a rain dance, believe that doing a rain dance
will make it rain, but he may not have the capability for rain.11 This
solves the side-effect problem as mentioned in section 3.
THEOREM 4. For modalities R1 and R2 such that R1 <strong R2, the
following formulae are satisfiable:
(a) R2(φ) ∧ R1(inevitable( (φ ⊃ γ))) ∧ ¬R2(γ)
(b) R2(φ) ∧ inevitable( R1(inevitable( (φ ⊃ γ)))) ∧ ¬R2(γ)
Proof: We prove the result for BEL and CAP. The proof for the
other pairs of modalities is similar. Assume CAP(φ) and BEL(inevitable(
(φ ⊃ γ))). Then, φ is true in every capability-accessible world. To be
able to infer that γ is true in each capability-accessible world, we would
need that φ ⊃ γ is true in each capability-accessible world. We know
that for every belief-accessible world inevitable( (φ ⊃ γ)) is true
and that for each belief-accessible world there is a capability-accessible
world. However, C may map to other worlds, where this is not true and
thus γ is not a capability. This shows the satisfiability of (a). Similar
reasoning yields (b). ♣
The formal semantics of capabilities as defined fit well into the ex-
isting BDI logic of Rao and Georgeff and allow definition of further
interesting types of agents. In section 7 we look at how this addition of
capabilities affects the specification of an abstract interpreter for BDI
systems and also what issues and questions arise for implementations
as the result of the theoretical exploration. First, however, we look at
an extension of and an alternative for the basic IC-system.
5. Extension of the IC-system
As indicated previously our semantics for capability does not support
reasoning that capability φ, and the belief that capability φ always
10 The alternative formulation referred to in section 5 does not have this property
with respect to capabilities.
11 The agent believes that it will rain, however. One may argue that an agent that
believes to have the capability for φ and believes that φ leads to γ, also believes that
he has the capability for γ. However, this would require the introduction of a new
axiom such as BEL(CAP(φ)) ∧ BEL(inevitable( (φ ⊃ γ))) ⊃ BEL(CAP(γ)).
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implies capability γ to lead to capability γ. While this semantics is jus-
tified by the work of others (Cross, 1986), and indeed seems intuitively
correct in some cases, it may also be the case that for some applications
we would prefer a semantics that does allow the above reasoning.
In this section we define an extension of the basic framework where
the semantics is such that the inference above is valid, supporting the
above reasoning.
5.1. Compatibility Axiom
The IC2-system requires in addition to the IC-system the following
axiom:
AIC1b BEL(inevitable φ) ⊃ CAP(inevitable φ)
The axiom states that if an agent believes that something is in-
evitably true then it also has the capability for this. Thus, if an agent
believes it is inevitable that the sun will rise then it is assumed that it
also has this capability.
The semantic condition associated with this axiom is:
CIC1b ∀ w′ ∈ Cwt , ∃ w
′′ ∈ Bwt : w
′ v w′′.
Thus every capability-accessible world is a sub-world of some belief-
accessible world.
5.2. Commitment Axioms
The definition of self-aware agent is not affected by the addition of
AIC1b. In practice, however, the interaction between capabilities and
beliefs is different.
Theorems 1 and 2 are still valid in this system.
5.3. Properties of the Logic
Theorem 3 holds for formulae of the form optional φ.
THEOREM 5. The following formulae are satisfiable:
(a) BEL(optional φ) ∧ ¬CAP(optional φ)
(b) inevitable( BEL(optional φ)) ∧ ¬CAP(optional φ)
Proof: Assume BEL(optional φ). Then, optional φ is true in every
belief-accessible world, i.e. there is a path in every belief-accessible
world such that φ is true. Every capability-accessible world is a sub-
world of some belief-accessible world and for every belief-accessible
world there is a capability-accessible sub-world. However, the capability-
accessible worlds do not need to contain the branch where φ is true
jaamas.tex; 3/08/2004; 10:47; p.19
20 Padgham and Lambrix
and therefore optional φ does not need to be true in every capability-
accessible world. This shows the satisfiability of (a). Similar reasoning
yields (b). ♣
Theorem 4 does not hold anymore for CAP and BEL. As this is the
theorem that states that it is possible to have CAP(φ) ∧BEL(inevitable(
(φ ⊃ γ))) ∧ ¬CAP(γ), this is precisely what we want. We obtain the
additional theorem that gives the desired implication that having ca-
pability φ and believing that φ inevitably implies γ is equivalent to
having the capability γ.
THEOREM 6. (a) CAP(φ) ∧ BEL(inevitable( (φ ⊃ γ))) ⊃ CAP(γ)
(b) CAP(φ) ∧ inevitable( BEL(inevitable( (φ ⊃ γ)))) ⊃ CAP(γ)
Proof: Follows from AIC1b and the K axiom for CAP. ♣
6. Alternative to the IC-system
In the basic IC-system an agent adopts goals for which there is a cor-
responding capability. An alternative way to constrain goal adoption
is to allow the agent to adopt as goals only formulae where there is a
corresponding belief to have the capability. This means that we have an
alternative capability-goal compatibility which states that if an agent
has an O-formula α as a goal, then the agent must believe to have α
as a capability.
Capability-Goal Compatibility
AIC2′ GOAL(α) ⊃ BEL(CAP(α))
CIC2′ ∀ w′ ∈ Bwt , ∀ w
′′ ∈ Cw
′
t , ∃ w
′′′ ∈ Gwt : w
′′′ v w′.
We observe that in this case AI1 cannot be obtained from AIC1 and
AIC2′, and therefore must be stated as a separate axiom.
Let the IC ′-system be the system satisfying AI1, AI2, AI4-AI6, AI8,
AIC1, AIC2 ′, AIC3 and AIC4. The IC-system and the IC ′-system
both satisfy GOAL(α) ⊃ BEL(CAP(α)) for O-formulae. Further, in
the IC-system goals are always constrained by capabilities. Thus, if the
agent does not have the capability, then it cannot have the goal. In the
IC ′-system, however, the situation can occur that the agent does not
have the capability but still has the goal. This can happen when the
agent believes it has the capability.12
12 The axiom in the IC ′-system seems more intuitive for extending to multi-
agent systems. There one would require that GOAL(a,α) ⊃ BEL(a,CAP(a,α) ∨ ∃
a′: CAP(a′,α)).
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We can then define an alternative self-aware agent by the IC ′-system
plus the following axiom AIC9d′.
AIC9d′ INTEND(inevitable♦φ) ⊃
inevitable(INTEND(inevitable♦φ)
⋃
(BEL(φ) ∨¬BEL(CAP(optional♦φ))))
It is then possible to prove alternatives for theorems 1 and 2.
We observe also that the IC-system and the IC ′-system become
equivalent in the case of competent agents (satisfying AI10, BEL(φ)
⊃ φ). This is because AIC2′ can be obtained from AIC2 and AIC3,
while AIC2 can be obtained from AIC2′ and AI10.
7. Implementation aspects
An abstraction of a BDI-interpreter which follows the logic of the basic
I-system is given in (Rao and Georgeff, 1992). The system maintains
three global basic data structures representing beliefs, goals and in-
tentions. We add now a data structure for capabilities. Each of these
data structures allow for update and query operations. Further, there
also exists a global event queue. The first stages in the cycle of this
abstract interpreter are to generate and select plan options. These are
filtered by current beliefs, goals and intentions. Capabilities (in the IC-
system) or beliefs about capabilities (in the IC ′-system) now provide an
additional filter on the options we generate and select. Once the options
are selected, the intention structure is updated and intentions on the
intention structure are executed. Then, external events are collected.
We note that update operations to the internal data structures can be
put on the global event queue continuously and therefore do not need an
explicit procedure. The drop procedures in the original interpreter drop
beliefs, goals and intentions based on the achievement of goals or on
the impossibility to achieve them. In the new procedures capabilities (in
the IC-system) and beliefs about capabilities (in the IC ′-system) must
be considered when dropping beliefs, goals and intentions. In a system
with dynamic roles capabilities themselves may also be dropped. Also,
in the IC2-system beliefs must be considered for dropping capabilities.
Thus we obtain this slightly modified version of the interpreter in (Rao
and Georgeff, 1992) as shown in figure 5.
This abstract interpreter is at a very high level and there are many
details which must be considered in the actual implementation that
are hidden in this abstraction. One important implementation detail
that is highlighted by the definitions of the various kinds of agents
(blindly committed, single-minded, open-minded and self-aware) has to
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initialise-state();
do
options :=
option-generator(event-queue,B,C,G,I);
selected-options :=
deliberate(options,B,C,G,I);
update-intentions(selected-options,I);
execute(I);
get-new-external-events();
drop-successful-attitudes(B,C,G,I);
drop-impossible-attitudes(B,C,G,I);
until quit.
Figure 5. BDI with capabilities interpreter
do with when intentions should be dropped. With respect to capabilities
the axiom AIC9d highlights the fact that if capabilities are allowed to
change during execution it may be necessary to drop some intentions
when a capability is lost/removed.
The observation that it is possible for an agent to have the capability
for φ, believe that φ implies γ, but not have the capability for γ (IC-
system), highlights an area where one may wish to make the agent
more “powerful” in its reasoning by disallowing this situation. This
is possible by a modification of the logical formalisation (IC2-system)
but has an impact on how the option generation and selection phases
of the abstract interpreter work. However, we observe that in this case
the effect of a plan is not necessarily part of the plan, but may have
been derived through a belief.
In (Rao and Georgeff, 1992) an example is given to illustrate the
workings of the specified abstract interpreter. In this example John
wants to quench his thirst and has plans (which are presented as a
special kind of belief) for doing this by drinking water or drinking soda,
both of which then become options and can be chosen as intentions
(instantiated plans that will be acted on).
It is also possible to construct the example where the agent believes
that rain always makes the garden wet, and that rain is eventually
possible, represented as:
BEL(inevitable (rain) ⊃ (garden-wet))
BEL(optional ♦(rain))
In the Rao and Georgeff formalism which does not differentiate
between plans and other kinds of beliefs this would allow our agent to
adopt (rain) as a GOAL. However, in the absence of any plan in the plan
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library for ever achieving rain this does not make intuitive sense - and
in fact could not happen in implemented systems. With the IC-system
presented here we would also require CAP(optional ♦(rain)) thus re-
stricting goal adoption to situations where the agent has appropriate
capabilities (i.e. plans).
This example demonstrates that in some respects the IC-system is
actually a more correct formalisation of implemented BDI systems than
the original I − system.
8. Related work
A number of systems have started to implement capability-like entities.
In JACK (Busetta et al., 1999a) capabilities are essentially a set of
plans, a fragment of the KB and an interface to the capability. In
the KAoS system (Bradshaw et al., 1997) capabilities are the services
or functions that an agent can provide. LARKS (Sycara et al., 1999)
defines a capability specification as a frame containing slots for context,
types, input, output, constraints on input and output, conceptual and
textual descriptions. None of these programming constructs are explic-
itly related to theoretical formalisms involving capability, ability, or a
notion of “can”.
There is a large body of theoretical work exploring the notion of
ability, achievability or “can”. More recently there is also work on
defining these concepts within computational systems that are able to
act in the world. For instance, in (Lin and Levesque, 1998; Lesperance
et al., 2000) achievability is defined as what goals can be achieved by a
robot given a basic action theory describing an initial state of the world
and some primitive actions available to the robot. Ability to achieve
a goal involves knowing what to do when in order to arrive at a goal
state. More precisely, an agent can achieve a goal in a situation if there
exists an action selection function such that the agent knows in the
original situation that it can get to a situation where the goal holds.
In (Dung, 1998) capability is defined as a function C such that for a
plan p and a state s, C(p,s) represents the set all possible execution
processes which could occur when the agent is executing p from s.
This work follows the general style of Moore’s definition of “can”
which requires that in order to say that an agent “can” φ, it must be
the case that if the agent wants φ, and the agent acts rationally, then it
will achieve φ. As discussed previously, this is a much more restrictive
view of capability than that which we use.
Munindar Singh defines a concept of “know-how” (Singh, 1998),
which is closely related to capability. He states that “an agent x knows
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how to achieve p, if he is able to bring about p through his actions”
(Singh, 1998, page 14). Singh also notes that ability is a concept sepa-
rate from opportunity, but that logical consideration of ability without
opportunity is technically complex. In his own formalism, know-how is
anchored to a point in time, and requires that in order to know how
to achieve p, the agent is able to select a series of actions, from that
point in time, that will result in p being true. Although the point in
time is most easily the current point - in which case opportunity must
also be present, it is possible for it to be some future time point. Our
sense of capability could then be described as the agent believing that
it is possible that there is a future time point where the agent “knows
how”.
We consider our definition of capability is precisely what is needed
to guide an agent in whether or not it is rational to adopt a particular
goal. However, the stronger notion of capability is possibly what is
required in order to commit to a plan - a rational agent chooses the
means by which it will achieve its goal, based on opportunity as well as
what we have called capability. In this sense the agent “can” achieve
φ when it has both a plan or way of achieving φ and an opportunity
to use that plan. It is at this point that the rational agent should
commit to the particular plan. This stronger notion of capability is that
which is used in work such as that by Shapiro et al. (Shapiro et al.,
1995) and allows reasoning about guarantees of achieving a goal. The
two notions of capability are perhaps appropriate to different stages
of commitment - the weaker notion is appropriate in order to make a
rational commitment to “intend that”, whereas the stronger notion is
appropriate in order to make the commitment to “intend how”.
This ambiguity over the meaning of “can” is discussed in the philo-
sophical literature, with a number of ideas as to what is the basis
of the ambiguity and what must be examined in order to obtain the
correct intuitive meaning. Some authors (e.g. (McCall, 1970)) make a
distinction between individual actions and action types. It is possible
to explain the difference between our view of capability, and that of
Levesque et al (Lin and Levesque, 1998; Lesperance et al., 2000) as
being primarily this difference between generic plan types and specific
instantiated plan instances.
However, we think the distinction between ability and opportunity
as discussed by Cross (Cross, 1986), with particular reference to the
importance of the ability sense of “can”, is the most important distinc-
tion between our work and that of others using the notion to reason
about what computational agents “can” do. We note Cross’ argument
that if “can” is a modal operator (as we have defined it to be), then it
is necessary that the accessibility relation be relative to an individual,
jaamas.tex; 3/08/2004; 10:47; p.24
Agent Capabilities 25
otherwise anomalies occur when formalising natural language expres-
sions. For example (taken from (Cross, 1986)) the sentences:
Bill can balance a banana on his nose while I stand on his shoulders,
and
I can stand on Bill’s shoulders while he balances a banana on his nose
would both be formalised as:
CAN(Bill balances a banana on his nose while I stand on his shoulders)
However in order to capture the intuitive meaning (and differences) in
the above sentences, we need something more like:
(Bill CAN(Bill balances a banana on his nose while I stand on his
shoulders)), and
(I CAN(Bill balances a banana on his nose while I stand on his shoul-
ders))
We agree completely with this, but as we are reasoning only about the
capabilities of a single agent, this relativisation is implicit.
We note that the situation we have in our basic IC-system, where
CAP(φ) ∧ BEL(φ→ γ) does not imply CAP(γ) also exists in the model
theoretic explanation of “can” given by Cross, even though this seems
at first glance to be odd. He argues that when can means ability (as it
does for us), then the above implication should indeed not follow.
van Linder, van der Hoek and Meyer have done extensive work on
formalising ability as part of their work on formal theories of agent
behaviour (van Linder et al., 1998; van Linder et al., 1999). They follow
the tradition of separating ability from opportunity and requiring both
for successful execution of actions. In their formal logic executing an
action when an opportunity does not exist, results in a counterfactual
state of affairs from which no further action is possible. Their work
differs from ours in that they are concerned with a finer level of granu-
larity and are concerned to be able to reason about logical composition
of ability. We assume composite capabilities to be represented directly
- a plan to achieve φ indicates a capability for φ and we assume that
the plan does not include sub-tasks for which the agent does not have
the capability (though a sub-task may include requesting help from
another agent to successfully realise the goal).
There is a fundamental difference in our approach as compared to
that of van Linder, van der Hoek and Meyer (and indeed others) in
that we do not attempt to build a formalism to allow reasoning about
when actions will succeed. Rather our reasoning is about when it is
rational to commit to a goal, or to commit to a plan as a particular
way of achieving a goal. This rationality requires only that there is
a reasonable chance of success, not that success is guaranteed. Well
engineered plan sets ensure that sub-tasks within a plan (or capability)
are matched to an agent’s capabilities (or that there is an expectation
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that another agent with the appropriate capability will co-operate). If
the opportunity exists for execution of the most abstract plan, then
the well engineered plan-set will ensure that opportunities are created
for the execution of sub-tasks (though exogenous factors may always
interfere).
9. Conclusion and Future Work
The formalisation of capabilities and their relationships to beliefs, goals
and intentions is a clean extension of the existing BDI theoretical
framework. It provides a theoretical basis for adoption of goals which
eliminates a current source of mismatch between theory and imple-
mented systems in that the theory allows adoption of goals which
there is no way to achieve. Current implemented BDI systems tend
to require both ability and opportunity before a commitment can be
made. However, we have explored in other work (Thangarajah et al.,
2002) the problems that can arise from this, where an agent should
commit to achievement of a goal (or at the very least retain the desire)
although there is no current opportunity that allows commitment to a
particular course of action to achieve the goal.
The implementation of capability modules in JACK is seen as an
abstraction of our notion of capability and we note that if reasoning is
to be done at the level of capability then it is important that capabilities
be self-contained, or that dependencies be explicitly represented so that
they can be reasoned about. This becomes important particularly if
capabilities are dynamic, or if agents exist in an open system where the
existence of other agents with needed capabilities cannot be guaranteed.
Exploration of how an agent’s knowledge of other agents’ capabilities
affects its own goals and intentions requires further work and some
modifications to the axioms relating goals to capabilities. This seems
to require a framework which allows for beliefs about other agent’s
capabilities. Goals would then be constrained by a combination of one’s
own capabilities plus beliefs about other agent’s capabilities.
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